Coming up with definitions in social science seems to be among the most notoriously difficult tasks. Helpful working definitions is rare in general because they are seldom precise and axiomatic enough to be operational; yet for such definitions to be precise and axiomatic is as necessary as it is impossible. It is necessary so that they provide the researchers with an unambiguous, discriminatory, and discrete set of concepts that can serve as operational boundaries, delineating specific implied meanings from the infinite number of possible interpretations of the abstract phenomena in question. But precise definitions are also impossible because of their apparent inability to satisfy two important characteristics implied by the notion of being axiomatic: to be simultaneously exhaustive and exclusive. By an association with the famous Kenneth Arrow's social theorem in political economy, no social science definition can ever satisfy these two criteria equally well at the same time. Researchers must settle for a trade-off. When a definition is exhaustive and seemingly complete in its coverage of possible meanings, it tends to be general, all-encompassing, and vague and therefore void of empirical precision -a crucial characteristic that makes it useful. By default, however, definitions must serve as identifiers, delineating the phenomenon under inquiry from other seemingly similar phenomena. Establishing the limits of a definition's scope, though, is very often driven by arbitrary considerations, which resemble lines drawn in the sand. When the definition is kept narrow and precise, it tends to be too particularistic and exclusive, and hence hardly useful for the purposes of generalization. This paradox was well captured by Sartori (1970) in a seminal discussion of the theoretical problems associated with definitions in comparative politics. On this specific paradox he comments: 'The rules for climbing and descending along a ladder of abstraction are thus very simple rules ... We make a concept more abstract and more general by lessening its properties or attributes ... ' (Ibid.: 1041) . Therefore, a definition on which a wide consensus is achievable is by default too broad and vague, located at the upper rungs of the ladder. In the case of euroscepticism, the higher we climb this ladder of definition, the more the incompatible notions will remain included under it. The cost of achieving consensus on a definition by climbing too high is a definition that is too general and vague, which, in turn, eliminates the very raison d'être and function of the definition in a first place. However, the farther down the ladder we descend, hence the more specific and nuanced we become, the less we are able to reach a consensus.
These rather abstract theoretical musings on the perennial problem of constructing the 'right' definition in the social sciences have their very empirical implications for a panoply of abstract political phenomena, especially those that we deem 'socially constructed'. They include nationalism, terrorism, globalization, and in this particular case, euroscepticism. Confronted with the task of defining, it is tempting to claim that because of their subjective and myopic nature, such phenomena are better left to reside in the 'eye of the beholder' and to move on, hoping by the end of the analysis to establish a better understanding of the elusive social construct at hand. A frequently evoked and controversial quote attributed to the late US Supreme Court justice, the Honourable Stewart Potter, sums up this alternative view rather well. In discussing pornography, he once explained the hard-core version of this entertainment genre, or, more precisely, the difficulty of defining the word 'obscene' in logical terms, by concluding: 'I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced ... [b] ut I know it when I see it ' (1964) .
1 From policy-making point of view, the 'eye of the beholder' approach potentially has many strategic advantages. Concluding that euroscepticism is just a black box, stuffed with content at will -ideology, strategy, identity, values, culture, and so onmay be extremely desirable to political entrepreneurs, who are the primary and most frequent subscribers to euroscepticism. From a scholarly point of view, however, such an approach is unsatisfactory to say the least. Hence, even a bad definition serves the purpose of research and analysis much better than no definition at all.
In the current study, I begin first by defining three separate components of the theoretical model: the structure, the process and the actors. This separation is necessary because their amalgamation frequently leads to confusion about the conflicting manifestations of
